The AI Copyright Fight Has Narrowed to One Fair-Use Factor
Developers and authors have nearly stopped arguing over whether training a model on a book transforms it. The fight that remains turns on whether the flood of machine-made competitors that training makes possible is a harm copyright's market-effect factor was built to stop.
Three district rulings, none of them the last word
Fair use is the escape valve in the Copyright Act. Section 107 lets someone copy a protected work without a license when four factors weigh, on balance, in the copier's favor: the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, how much of it was taken, and the effect of the use on the market for the original. Whether training a generative model on copyrighted books and articles clears that bar reached the merits three times in 2025. The rulings do not line up.
In June, in the same San Francisco courthouse and two days apart, two judges read comparable records and came out opposite ways. Judge William Alsup held that training Anthropic's Claude models on books was "exceedingly transformative," a use that repurposes rather than substitutes, and therefore a fair use.1 Judge Vince Chhabria granted Meta summary judgment on its own training claim, then wrote that he had done so only because the thirteen authors before him "presented no meaningful evidence on market dilution at all," and that in most cases training on copyrighted books will likely be illegal.2 Four months earlier, Judge Stephanos Bibas had handed down the first of the three orders, holding that Ross Intelligence's copying of Westlaw editorial headnotes to build a competing legal-research tool was not transformative and not fair use, with the market-effect factor favoring Thomson Reuters because Ross set out to build a market substitute; Ross was found to have copied 2,243 of the 2,830 headnotes at issue.3
Neither generative ruling is the clean victory a headline could make of it. Alsup split his case in two. Training on lawfully acquired books was fair use, but the way Anthropic had stocked its library was not: it had downloaded "over seven million copies of books" from pirate sites and kept them, and "such piracy of otherwise available copies is inherently, irredeemably infringing" even when the pirated copy is then put to a transformative use.1 Anthropic settled that surviving liability in September. The plaintiffs' motion for preliminary approval valued the fund at about $1.5 billion, roughly $3,000 for each of some 500,000 works, and called it the largest publicly reported copyright recovery in history.4 Anthropic's deputy general counsel said the deal would "resolve the plaintiffs' remaining legacy claims."5 Chhabria's win for Meta is narrower still: his order "does not stand for the proposition that Meta's use of copyrighted materials to train its language models is lawful," and binds only the thirteen plaintiffs before him.2 No appellate court has yet weighed in. The Ross appeal, cabined to non-generative AI, is the first to reach the Third Circuit.3 What each side would put its name on is already on the record, in briefs, testimony, and public statements, and in the two June orders that adopted opposite halves of it.
OpenAI, Anthropic, the EFF, and the scholars of non-expressive use
Copying a work to train a model is a transformative, non-expressive use that copyright has long permitted, because the model learns unprotectable facts and patterns rather than republishing the work, and any liability belongs to infringing outputs, not to training.
OpenAI states the position without qualification: "Training AI models using publicly available internet materials is fair use, as supported by long-standing and widely accepted precedents." It calls The New York Times suit "without merit" and describes verbatim regurgitation of training text as "a rare bug that we are working to drive to zero."6
The scholarly form of that claim is Matthew Sag's. A non-expressive use copies a work to extract unprotected information from it, facts, statistics, and statistical relationships, without conveying the work's original expression to a human reader. Sag told the Senate Judiciary Committee that "training generative AI on copyrighted works is usually fair use because it falls into the category of non-expressive," the same category courts had already blessed for reverse engineering, search-engine indexing, and plagiarism detection. If a model "is trained properly and operated with appropriate safeguards," he testified, "its outputs will not resemble its inputs in a way that would trigger copyright liability."7
This is the theory Alsup adopted. He called the purpose of training transformative "spectacularly so," and rested the case on the fourth factor, the effect of the use on the market for or value of the original. The authors had argued that training would produce an "explosion of works competing with their works." That, Alsup wrote, "is not the kind of competitive or creative displacement that concerns the Copyright Act. The Act seeks to advance original works of authorship, not to protect authors against competition," and so "the fourth factor thus favors fair use for the training copies."1
The Electronic Frontier Foundation, which files amicus briefs on this side, presses the public consequence. Building a model is "beyond anything that any copyright owner rightly could expect to control"; copyright exists "to be an engine for new expression," so where AI works compete with the originals "that's a feature, not a bug"; and forcing copyright to police "market dilution" would "only hurt important and legal uses." The right rule, it argues, is Alsup's: courts "should look to Bartz, not Kadrey."8
Matthew Sag (Emory Law), standing here because he laid out the non-expressive-use theory that the labs' briefs and Alsup's order both draw on, under oath before the Senate, and marked its own limits as he did.7
The New York Times, the Authors Guild, Getty Images, and the scholars of the training-data market
Training is mass unlicensed copying done to build commercial products that compete with the very works copied, at a moment when a market to license training data already exists, so it is infringement that a license, not a fair-use defense, must cure.
The New York Times filed that there is "nothing 'transformative' about using The Times's content without payment to create products that substitute for The Times and steal audiences away from it," and that the defendants "seek to free-ride on The Times's massive investment in its journalism by using it to build substitutive products without permission or payment." The complaint demands "billions of dollars in statutory and actual damages," a claim it still must prove.9
The Authors Guild put the livelihood claim on the record when it sued OpenAI for a class including John Grisham, George R.R. Martin, and Jodi Picoult. Its chief executive, Mary Rasenberger, called generative AI a threat to "decimate the author profession" and, for fiction writers, "identity theft on a grand scale," while co-counsel argued the labs "could have 'trained' their large language models on works in the public domain or paid a reasonable licensing fee." The Guild pegs median full-time author income at about $20,000, the margin it says the copying puts at risk.10
This is the theory Chhabria credited. Where Alsup saw competition, Chhabria saw substitution. "By training generative AI models with copyrighted works," he wrote, "companies are creating something that often will dramatically undermine the market for those works," and "indirect substitution is still substitution." Market dilution is the harm to a work's market from a flood of similar works a model can now generate on demand, even when no single output reproduces the original, and Chhabria predicted it "will often cause plaintiffs to decisively win the fourth factor."2 The Authors Guild, reacting to Alsup, said his order "fails to look at the actual harm already being caused by Claude in generating books and articles that directly compete with the originals," and called his digitization holding contrary to "how the publishing markets work."11
The scholarly form of the claim is Jane Ginsburg's. She argues for decoupling the inputs from the outputs: even where a model's outputs do not infringe, "commercial copying (at least) to create training data would be for the same purpose" as the licensing market now emerging "in news media and scholarly publishing," so after the Supreme Court's Warhol decision whether input-copying is transformative "may depend on whether there is a market for licensing content for training data."12 Getty Images presses the visual-artist version, insisting its "copyright-protected works were used to train Stable Diffusion" and urging governments to set "stronger transparency rules."13 Getty had abandoned its central UK copyright and database claims, and the High Court held that the model weights "are not themselves an infringing copy."14 The U.S. Copyright Office, in its 2025 training report, sits between the camps but leans this way on the market: "if thousands of AI-generated romance novels are put on the market, fewer of the human-authored romance novels that the AI was trained on are likely to be sold."15
Jane C. Ginsburg (Columbia Law), standing here because she reframed the dispute around the emerging market for training data, the ground on which the transformative and market-effect factors are now argued after Warhol.12
The disagreement has collapsed onto the fourth factor
What no longer divides the sides is most of the doctrine. Both generative rulings hold that training is transformative; Alsup calls it spectacularly so,1 and Chhabria agrees the point is not seriously disputable.2 The Copyright Office concedes that "various uses of copyrighted works in AI training are likely to be transformative."15 The rights-holders' own scholar grants that outputs often will not infringe, which is why she moves the fight to the inputs.12 Strip away what everyone agrees on and one factor is left holding the entire question: the effect of the use on the market.
Inside that factor sit two disagreements of different kinds, and the cases keep fusing them. The first is legal, a dispute about what the statute protects. Does the market-effect factor reach "market dilution," the slow erosion of a work's market by a glut of machine-made substitutes, or only the direct substitution of one copy for another? Alsup says the statute "seeks to advance original works of authorship, not to protect authors against competition."1 Chhabria says "indirect substitution is still substitution," and the Copyright Office agrees dilution is a "serious risk" the factor should count.215 The EFF answers that policing dilution would reach uses copyright was never meant to control.8 Neither judge misread the record here; they read the same clause of the same statute to protect different things.
The second disagreement is a forecast, and it is where the litigation actually turns. Even Chhabria's theory needs proof: Meta won not because dilution does not count but because the plaintiffs "presented no meaningful evidence on market dilution at all."2 The theory that could sink the labs has never been carried on a trial record. Whether it can be is a claim about the world, not the statute: whether the outputs of a given model measurably displace sales of the specific works it trained on, and whether a plaintiff can quantify it. Each camp's strongest voice concedes the hinge. Sag grants that if a model's ordinary outputs infringe or its access was unlawful, "there is no obvious fair use rationale to replace" non-expressive use;7 Alsup proved the access half by holding Anthropic's piracy unprotected, and Anthropic paid $1.5 billion to close it.14 Neither absolute survives its own side's best minds.
Two things would settle it, and both are in motion. One is an appellate ruling on whether dilution is cognizable under the fourth factor; the split across the district orders makes review close to inevitable, and the Ross appeal, though it turns on non-generative copying, is already before the Third Circuit.3 The other is a trial record in which a well-resourced plaintiff finally proves dilution of the works actually trained on. The New York Times, which has pleaded substitution directly and can fund the market economics Kadrey's authors did not, is the case that will test whether the harm can be shown rather than asserted.9 Until one plaintiff proves the market harm and one appeals court says whether that harm counts, the record supports no verdict wider than the one both judges reached in their own cases: it depends on the use, and on evidence no one has yet put in.
Sources
- U.S. District Court, N.D. Cal. · Order on Fair Use, Bartz v. Anthropic, No. 3:24-cv-05417-WHA (Judge William Alsup, June 23, 2025)
- U.S. District Court, N.D. Cal. · Order on Fair Use, Kadrey v. Meta Platforms, No. 3:23-cv-03417-VC (Judge Vince Chhabria, June 25, 2025)
- U.S. District Court, D. Del. · Memorandum Opinion on Fair Use, Thomson Reuters Enterprise Centre GmbH v. Ross Intelligence Inc. (Judge Stephanos Bibas, Feb. 11, 2025)
- U.S. District Court, N.D. Cal. · Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement, Bartz v. Anthropic, No. 3:24-cv-05417-WHA, Dkt. 363 (Sept. 8, 2025)
- Anthropic, settlement statement in Bartz v. Anthropic (Sept. 5, 2025), as reported by NPR
- OpenAI · "OpenAI and journalism" (Jan. 8, 2024)
- Matthew Sag · Written Testimony, U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, "Copyright and Artificial Intelligence" (July 12, 2023)
- Electronic Frontier Foundation · "Two Courts Rule On Generative AI and Fair Use — One Gets It Right" (June 2025)
- The New York Times Company v. Microsoft & OpenAI · Complaint, No. 1:23-cv-11195 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 27, 2023)
- The Authors Guild · "The Authors Guild, John Grisham, Jodi Picoult, David Baldacci, George R.R. Martin, and 13 Other Authors File Class-Action Suit Against OpenAI" (Sept. 20, 2023)
- The Authors Guild · "Mixed Decision in Anthropic AI Case" (June 25, 2025)
- Jane C. Ginsburg · "AI Input Data and Fair Use: A View from the U.S." (Columbia Law School faculty scholarship, 2024)
- Getty Images · "Getty Images issues statement on ruling in Stability AI UK litigation" (Nov. 4, 2025)
- High Court of Justice (England & Wales) · Getty Images (US) Inc & Ors v Stability AI Ltd, [2025] EWHC 2863 (Ch) (Nov. 4, 2025)
- U.S. Copyright Office · "Copyright and Artificial Intelligence, Part 3: Generative AI Training" (Pre-Publication Version, May 2025)